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In order to tackle the question of whether Islam can grow in the shadowof the Chinese Communist Party, with its legacy of religious repressionand its fear of infiltration by globalised religious forces, we will look at
concrete interactions between the state and religion in the People’s Republic
of China. This work breaks with studies of religions in China from the point
of view of the central state and its regulations. The aim of such studies,
which are based on official documents, is to produce an appraisal of official
religious policy. (1) However, they fail to grasp the complexity of local situ-
ations. Moreover, the tendency of such a top-down approach is to present
the relationship between the state and religious communities as being
based purely on management and repression. On the other hand, a number
of other research projects focus on the religious communities themselves,
highlighting their values, the relationships that structure such communities,
and the development of cultural practices. Studies of this kind, focused as
they are on the communities, contribute vast amounts of information and
provide the basis for understanding their internal workings. (2) However, em-
phasising the communities as such tends to implicitly separate the religious
field from the workings of the state.
We wish to explore the heart of negotiations between the state and Mus-
lim communities to define a space for worship. In order to do so, we will
concentrate on the players who are central to these interactions: the official
Islamic associations.
Ever since the early years of the People’s Republic of China, the religious
policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been based on patriotic
religious associations in charge of the five authorised religions: Buddhism,
Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. (3) Little research has been
carried out into these ambivalent associations, which were created by the
Party-state both to represent the interests of believers and to apply religious
policies. The interaction between these two roles, which at first glance seem
contradictory, needs to be clarified.
In the case of Islam, the grouping together of Chinese Muslims into ten
national minorities (shaoshu minzu), (4) giving them an official status in re-
lation to the Han majority, further complicates the situation. In addition to
the Party-state’s approach to the communities in terms of religious policies
is its so-called “national minorities work” (minzu gongzuo). In the case of
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the Muslim minorities, this “work” mainly affects their eating, funerary, and
cultural habits. Apart from their religious value, these three subjects are
dealt with as customs of the groups. (5) The two facets of Islam in China, the
religious and the “ethnic,” are inextricably linked from the perspective of
the state and Islamic associations. This duality sets Islam apart from the
other religions in China and results in different political treatment. As we
will see, this can sometimes assist access to state subsidies, but can also
legitimise the intervention of the state into the affairs of the Muslim com-
munity.
Few studies have been carried out to illuminate the local implementation
of religious policies, which provide the stage for power struggles that vary
from area to area and religion to religion. As demonstrated by Yoshiko
Ashiwa and David L. Wank in their study on Nanputuo Temple in Xiamen, (6)
or indeed David Palmer in his work on the qigong movement, (7) the net-
works of players need to be brought to light in order to truly understand
the interactions between the state, the Party, and the religious organisations.
What, then, are the factors that help explain local variations in how Islam,
in particular, is managed? We will endeavour to answer this question by fo-
cusing on the Nanjing Islamic Association (NIA), (8) a local organisation of
the national association responsible for Islam, the Islamic Association of
China (IAC). (9)
The city of Nanjing, capital of the Jiangsu Province, is an interesting case.
It does not have the exceptional character of Beijing where, as the centre
of power, ideological orthodoxy appears to play an important role in the
implementation of religious policy. Moreover, Nanjing is far more accessible
than other regions where Muslims are more numerous, such as Xinjiang, es-
pecially since the separatist question does not colour the authorities’ ap-
proach to the religious community.
Less than 2% of the population of Nanjing are officially registered Mus-
lims. (10) Despite the small size of their group in numerical terms, the history
of Nanjing’s Muslims is very particular. The Muslim population of Nanjing
is especially urbanised and integrated into the running of the city. As the
imperial capital at the start of the Ming dynasty (between 1368 and 1421),
Nanjing attracted Muslim populations from the shopkeeper and educated
classes. (11) In the Jiangnan region, which extends roughly between Shanghai,
Hangzhou, and Nanjing, an Islamic educational network that would have a
very strong influence in the history of Chinese Islam grew at the end of the
Ming dynasty and under the Qing. This network was responsible for dissem-
inating Islamic knowledge of Confucian inspiration in Chinese in the form
of the Han kitab compilation, (12) the first corpus of Islamic texts written in
Chinese. The Muslim intellectuals behind the Han kitab portrayed their dis-
tinctive religious and cultural characteristics as being not only inoffensive
to Chinese society but also echoing Confucian values, putting to one side
any political claims of Chinese Islam. (13) This role in the history of Chinese
Islam gave the city of Nanjing a symbolic position in terms of representa-
tion of the Hui community, despite its relatively small Muslim population. (14)
Since the 2000s, the ranks of this ancient Muslim community have been
swelled by increasing internal migration of Muslim populations coming pre-
dominantly from the provinces in northwest China with a high proportion
of Muslims, in particular Gansu. In Nanjing in 2011, between 70,000 and
80,000 Muslims held a residence permit for the city, and there were a fur-
ther estimated 30,000 to 53,000 migrants, depending on the source. (15) The
migrants, who are generally more devout than local Muslims, fill Nanjing’s
mosques. (16) This growth in religious fervour in the eastern regions has led
to a problem concerning a shortage of places of worship.
The aim of this article is to highlight the historical legacies and networks
of players who influence local Islam in its relationship with the Party-state.
It is based on field work carried out in Nanjing at the beginning of 2011,
which allowed us to access internal documents of the Nanjing Islamic As-
sociation and the mosque management committees, as well as to conduct
25 interviews with officials of the Party-state, members of the religious or-
ders, leaders of municipal and provincial Islamic Associations, and other
members of the Muslim community, intellectuals, and shopkeepers.
The historical centralisation of the
management of Islam in Nanjing
A legacy of national Muslim organisations in Nanjing
In order to understand the specific situation of Islam in Nanjing, attention
needs to be turned to the legacy of the Muslim organisations that existed
prior to the People’s Republic of China. Current relations between mosques,
religious associations, and administrations of the Party-state can be traced
back to a strong tradition of centralising the management of local Islam.
Under the Republic of China, Muslim populations organised themselves
into interest groups in order not to be treated as marginal or potentially
dangerous groups. The Chinese state needed bodies representing the various
religions with whom they could liaise in order to negotiate a boundary be-
tween the political and the religious. For this reason, one of the first Islamic
associations with a national reach, the Islamic Union of the Republic of
China (Zhonghua minguo huijiao lianhehui), was created in 1912 in Nanjing,
which at that time was the capital. (17) The Islamic Union was in competition
with the Association for the Advancement of Islam in China (Zhongguo hui-
jiao jujinhui), which was created in Beijing the same year. (18) Both associa-
tions collapsed during the first years of their existence or at the time of the
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6. See Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, “The politics of a reviving Buddhist Temple: State, Associ-
ation, and Religion in Southeast China,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2006, pp. 337-
359.
7. David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China, Columbia University Press,
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8. “Nanjingshi yisilanjiao xiehui” in Chinese.
9. “Zhongguo yisilanjiao xiehui” in Chinese.
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process of urbanisation of Chinese Islam), Shijie zongjiao wenhua, 2010, pp. 56-60.
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13. James D. Frankel, “‘Apoliticization’: One Facet of Chinese Islam,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Vol. 28, No. 3, 2008, pp. 421- 434.
14. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, The Dao Of Muhammad: A Cultural History Of Muslims In Late Imperial China,
Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2005.
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grants to adapt to urban society), Nanjing musilin, February 2011, pp. 49-50; Mi Shoujiang,
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attracted just 600 people to celebrate the start of the month of Ramadan. This number has now
risen to nearly 10,000 people. See Wu Yiye, Nanjing huijiao yisilanjiao shigao (Manuscript on the
history of Islam and the Hui of Nanjing), Nanjing, Nanjing yisilanjiao xiehui, 1999, p. 244.
17. Ibid., p. 215.
18. Elisabeth Allès, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi and Constance-Hélène Halfon, “L’islam chinois, unité et frag-
mentation” (Chinese Islam, unity, and fragmentation), Archives de sciences sociales des religions,
No. 115, 2001, p. 16.
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Sino-Japanese War, and their brief existences did not allow them enough
time to have a significant effect on how the religion was managed. In spite
of this, they did leave behind a legacy based on a stance of both separation
from state institutions and direct dialogue with the state. (19)
When a central government was established in 1928, a new generation
of associations was born. The main national Muslim organisation was then
the Friendly Association of the Hui People of China for the Salvation of the
Country (Zhongguo huimin jiuguo xiehui), which was founded in 1938 in
Nanjing. In 1939, it moved to Chongqing with the nationalist government,
which was fleeing the Japanese advance. In 1943, it changed its name to
the Chinese Muslim Society (Zhongguo huijiao xiehui zonghui) before re-
turning to Nanjing in 1945. However, it did not have time to remodel the
traditional way in which mosques were managed before it was forced to
leave for Taiwan in 1949 with the government of the Republic of China,
where it is still based today.
After the city was taken by the People’s Liberation Army, Ma Zhuoran, an of-
ficial in the municipal United Front Department (20) and director of the Provin-
cial National Minority Affairs Bureau, established an association responsible
for organising the worship of Islam. (21) The Preparation Committee of the As-
sociation of Hui People of Nanjing (Nanjing huimin xiehui choubei weiyuanhui)
was set up, taking over the old premises and assuming the task of managing
the local organisation of the Chinese Muslim Society. This provisional commit-
tee was replaced in May 1954 by the Association for the advancement of Hui
culture of Nanjing (Nanjingshi huimin wenhua xiejinhui), which became the
Nanjing Islamic Association (Nanjingshi yisilanjiao xiehui, NIA) on 5 April 1959,
once again under the direction of Party official Ma Zhuoran. (22)
The NIA was one of the first local Islamic associations, created on the
model of the Islamic Association of China (IAC). (23) It was the first local as-
sociation to be established in a coastal province, where the percentage of
Muslims was very low. The network of local associations therefore grew
mainly in the 1980s, and they continue to be created at the district level
today. (24) This early opening of the NIA is understandable in view of the
legacy of the Islamic organisations already present in the city at the time
of the Republic.
The centralisation of control of the mosques
Alongside the patriotic associations, organisations for managing places of
worship were also developing. In January 1950, the Management Commit-
tee of the Mosque on Taiping Street in Nanjing (Nanjing taipinglu qingzhensi
guanli weiyuanhui) was created. Based on the model of the old mosque
management teams that existed under the Empire, (25) the mosque managed
its finances, its activities, and the distribution of scholarships for Hui schools
in the city. The management committee was led by the party official Ma
Zhuoran, unlike the old mosque management teams, which enjoyed inde-
pendence from the state. Similar teams were set up in the same year for
other mosques in the city.
In 1958, a reform was initiated at a national level with the aim of elimi-
nating “feudal elements” of Chinese Islam, in particular targeting the inde-
pendent system of managing the mosques. (26) This resulted in the merging
of the various management groups into one mosque management team in
Nanjing (Nanjingshi qingzhensi guanlizu). (27) The number of active mosques
in Nanjing also dropped dramatically at the time of this reform. Of the 32
mosques and two religious schools that had been operating, only eight
mosques remained open. Management of the other premises was handed
back to the municipal housing management administration (shifang
guanju), (28) which was required to pay a proportion of the rent generated
to the mosque management team.
The centralised administration of the mosques introduced with the
mosque management team of Nanjing represented a real break with the
past, because it was the first system of shared management of the mosques
of Nanjing, and was strengthened by the loss of financial independence of
the mosques. Unlike the situation that held sway under the Qing and during
the Republic, the mosques no longer benefitted from the support of the
tradesmen’s guilds, which disappeared after 1949. (29) The centralisation of
management of religion in the early days of the PRC prepared the ground
perfectly for the very strong presence of the Nanjing Islamic Association in
the administration of the mosques. From the start, however, the NIA and
the management team had only a reduced level of activity because of the
anti-religious movements that began in 1958. The NIA, like the administra-
tion responsible for religious affairs, (30) stopped operating completely in
1966 with the start of the Cultural Revolution. (31)
In Nanjing, the administration responsible for religious and national mi-
nority affairs, which was to become the municipal religious and national
minority affairs Bureau (minzu zongjiao shiwuju) in 1981, reopened its doors
in June 1979 (32) and was followed in November of that year by the NIA,
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30. Wu Yiye, Nanjing huijiao yisilanjiao shigao, p. 200.
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time (On this subject, in particular, see: Donald E. MacInnis, Religious policy and practice in Com-
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32. Wu Yiye, Nanjing huijiao yisilanjiao shigao, art. cit., p. 203.
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which then found itself in a precarious position. It was required to manage
the restoration of places of worship that had been destroyed or transformed
into places of production during the Cultural Revolution, but had not re-
ceived any income during the course of the previous decade.
The rehabilitation of the main mosques of Nanjing was made possible by
the decision of the Municipal Committee of the CCP in 1980 to give the
NIA the right to manage the land and buildings that had been placed under
the control of the municipal housing management administration in 1958.
Moreover, the association received 300,000 yuan in compensation for the
rent not paid by this administration between 1966 and 1980. (33) In reality,
the land that was gradually returned to the NIA only constituted around a
third of the land of the old mosques and religious schools that had been
handed, for management purposes, to the municipal housing management
administration in 1958. The remainder was kept by the municipality to de-
velop its infrastructure, in particular to provide space to build new roads
and widen existing ones. The NIA thus obtains the vast majority of its in-
come from rent paid on this land. It also used some of the land for its own
purposes, in particular for housing the ahong (34) or for developing businesses.
In addition to inheriting control of the land and the associated income,
the NIA took back centralised control of the mosques, which had been put
in place in 1958. This was a different situation to that found in provinces
that had a higher Muslim population density, where mosques were placed
under decentralised management.
The distinctive nature of minority Islam
Although the number of local Islamic associations grew considerably in
the 1980s, (35) our interviews reveal that in many provinces they enjoyed
only a limited role, essentially as mediators between the mosques and local
government. Control of the mosques and their finances was decentralised
at the level of the mosque management committees, which were set up
systematically by the “Measures for the Democratic Management of
Mosques” (qingzhensi minzhu guanli shixing banfa) published by the Islamic
Association of China in 1993. This arrangement was especially common in
provinces that had a high Muslim population that, by way of its donations,
maintained the financial power of the management teams. (36)
The independent system of managing the mosques needs to be viewed
through the prism of opposing denominations within Chinese Islam. (37) The
local Islamic associations are unable to directly manage these denomina-
tions that differ between mosques. The mosques are, moreover, too numer-
ous in the provinces with high proportions of Muslims to be managed
centrally. An article by Zhang Jingquan, Li Jinxin, and Wang Wei concerning
the local Islamic associations in Xinjiang describes their limited role, show-
ing how the associations’ lack of means, and their distance from the com-
munities, prove a major hindrance to their work. They are therefore brought
back to communication channels that enable the state to enter into contact
with the mosques and to obtain information on the situation of local
Islam. (38)
However, our interviews also show that the arrangement that prevails in
provinces with a small percentage of Muslims involves control centralised
at the level of the local Islamic association. There are too few Muslims, and
they are not sufficiently involved in community life to fund the mosques
with their donations. This situation results in financial management being
shared at the level of the Islamic association. For example, in Nanjing, the
NIA not only inherited control of the land and the associated income, it
also took back centralised control of the mosques, which had been put in
place in 1958.
This means that the mosque management teams in Nanjing are left with
almost no financial power. They are instead relegated to managing the day-
to-day running of the mosques (water, electricity, cleaning), which they fi-
nance with donations from believers with the agreement of the NIA. In
addition to having a say with regard to their nomination, the NIA includes
the leaders of the city’s mosque management committees in its permanent
committee. This inclusion of their officials, coupled with their financial de-
pendence on the NIA, makes the mosque management committees an ex-
tension of the latter.
This particular link between the NIA and the mosque management com-
mittees plays on the treatment of religious officials. As stipulated by the
“Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” the management
team of each mosque is responsible for recruiting the ahong, whereas the
local Islamic association is merely required to authorise the nomination, or
not. (39) In Nanjing, however, religious officials are more closely linked to the
NIA than to the mosques because the association, being in control of the
religion’s finances, is responsible for employing the ahong.
In regions with a high proportion of Muslims, the ahong traditionally move
to a different mosque every three years. In Nanjing, since they are linked
to the NIA rather than to places of worship, they change mosque very rarely,
because there are too few establishments to allow a system of rotation to
be properly implemented. This sedentary practice is negative from the per-
spective of the religious officials, because it does not allow them to regularly
come upon new local situations that would force them to work on their
faith and on their religious practice. Gradually, “the ahong are turning into
officials,” one restaurant owner from Gansu told me. Their religious practice
apparently leaves so much to be desired that they need to be monitored to
ensure that they follow the religious rites.
This daily monitoring of religious officials is carried out by the mosque
management committees and supervised by the NIA, and involves assessing
the religious practice of the ahong, the time they spend studying, services
rendered to the community, and political behaviour. The ostensible aim of
monitoring the work of the ahong is to improve and standardise it. In prac-
tice, it tends to foster procedural quibbling, while the spiritual dimension of
their work is not a consideration. If they do not follow the practical recom-
mendations of the NIA in terms of the daily religious rites, ahong can be ex-
cluded or dismissed. The association therefore plays off the inconsistency
between the pinpoint precision of certain details of the regulations (going
as far as to describe the clothing to be worn by the ahong for funeral cere-
monies) against the vague nature of expressions such as “service to the pop-
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ulation,” which can lead to a high degree of self-censorship by the ahong.
The movement to “interpret the Quran” (Jiejing), announced in 2001 by
the IAC before being implemented by the local Islamic associations, is a
good example of the subtle control exerted on religious officials. It has the
aim of removing poor quality sermons, in particular those that incite reli-
gious extremism, terrorism, and separatism, and is not embodied in clearly
defined rules. It is more directed towards giving the ahong guidelines and
imposing them gradually by practice and example. In 2002, for example,
the IAC established sermon competitions, attracting ahong from all over
the country and rewarding the sermons they judged to be the best. These
competitions, which have been held in Jiangsu since 2002, often provide
the opportunity to assemble collections of sermons that will subsequently
be presented to religious officials as models. (40)
This omnipresence of administrative officials, and the very tight margin
for manoeuvre left to religious officials all the way down to their daily reli-
gious practice, provides a powerful illustration of the administrative work-
ings of Chinese religious associations, as highlighted by David Palmer in his
description of them as “religious danwei.” (41) The ahong are thus brought
into a position of administrative and financial dependency on the NIA, in
an atmosphere where the procedural completion of the rites, given the same
level of importance as administrative tasks, takes precedence over the spir-
itual side of the job.
The centralised management method that we have mentioned and the fi-
nancial dependency of the mosques and ahong with regard to the NIA ensures
the preponderance of the latter. We shall now consider how the state and Party
supervise these associations in order to safeguard their chain of control.
The consanguinity of the association and
the administration
The internal structure of Islamic associations and
their administrative environment
The NIA belongs to a network of Chinese Islamic associations connected
to each other in a pyramid model with the Islamic Association of China at its
apex. Officially, associations operating at a higher level “supervise” the actions
of their local offshoots. (42) This mainly involves the exchange of information
and directives. The IAC produces a certain number of regulations, which are
often applications of policies or administrative rules that are implemented at
the provincial and then the municipal level. There are no financial links be-
tween the associations operating at different levels. The weakness of the links
between Islamic associations therefore echoes the situation that has been
brought to light with regard to other religions in China. (43)
The local associations all operate on the basis of a statute similar to that
of the IAC. (44) As emphasised by the idea of “religious danwei,” (45) the very
structure of the religious associations is very close to that of the organisa-
tions of the CCP involving a congress of representatives (46) that meets every
five years to appoint a committee with decision-making power. Apart from
appointing the committee and having the power to revise the statute of
the association, the congress has a limited role. The core of decision-making
power is actually delegated to the association committee, which consists
of roughly half of the representatives and in turn appoints a permanent
committee and a management team from within. (47)
Legally, the Islamic associations are required to register with the Civil Af-
fairs Bureau (minzhengju) in the same way as all other social organisations,
and with the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) in their capacity as religious or-
ganisations. The legality of their activities is then subject to monitoring by
these institutions. (48) More broadly, local religious associations are required
to compromise with an array of Party and State institutions. Apart from
their limited relations with the higher-level Islamic associations, these as-
sociations may need to liaise with the RAB, the United Front Department
or the Political Consultative Conference. In exceptional cases, they may
come into contact with other government agencies, in particular the Public
Security Bureau, in order to ensure security on religious feast days or to
manage illegal forms of worship, which do not fall under the RAB’s jurisdic-
tion. Although these various bodies have been identified in many research
projects into the local administration of religion in the People’s Republic of
China, (49) their respective remit, their weights in terms of decision-making,
and the types of relationships they foster with the Islamic associations re-
main unknown.
The municipal RAB is the state department that has the most regular re-
lations with the NIA. It is also the body with which the association needs
to liaise most when it wishes to make a request to the local government
with the aim of obtaining either authorisations or funding. Two departments
within this body are responsible for the link with Islam: in addition to its
First Religious Affairs Bureau (zongjiao yichu), which deals with Muslims as
believers, the municipal RAB encompasses the National Minority Affairs Bu-
reau, which approaches them as members of these minorities.
In Nanjing, the National Minority Affairs Bureau is the main body with
which the NIA liaises. Islam is therefore treated more as a cultural trait of
certain national minorities than as a universal religion. This means that local
state authorities are able to intervene directly in the management of the
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religion, for example by financing the construction or repair of mosques,
which in theory is illegal owing to the principle of independence of religion
stipulated in Article 1 of the “Regulation on Religious Affairs.”
The close relations between the RAB and the Islamic associations are re-
inforced by the repeated presence of the same officials responsible for re-
ligious and national minority affairs at plenary sessions of the NIA and at
other periodic meetings. The closeness of this link can be strengthened fur-
ther if the official in question is a Hui, and their mediation role is then fa-
cilitated, as noted by Maris Boyd Gillette in her work on Xi’an. (50) This was
the case, notably, of a former vice-director of the RAB in Jiangsu, who drew
attention to himself by the way in which he managed a crisis in Yangzhou.
He wore a white hat to address a group of Muslims, thus indicating his af-
filiation with Islam, which was seen as a bold move for an official who is
not supposed to display any religious affiliation.
Indeed, being on the front line for criticism and demands from members
of the NIA, the powers enjoyed by the RAB appear to be very limited. Re-
garding the building of mosques, the municipal RAB is unable to make uni-
lateral rulings. Article 13 of the “Regulation on Religious Affairs” stipulates
that a religious association needs to obtain the agreement of the local RAB
in order to establish a new place of worship. However, in practice, the
process is more complex. In order to open a new mosque, the NIA needs to
be given the green light by the provincial RAB as well as the municipal RAB.
This is an unwritten practice, and one that does not necessarily hold true
for other religions or in other provinces. For example, our interviews revealed
that Buddhist temples are considered to be less sensitive and too numerous
to be managed at the provincial level, so the decision-making power lies at
the municipal level. Mosques are far fewer in number in the coastal regions,
and the Party-state views Islam as a more sensitive question due to the dis-
senting dimension of Islamic fundamentalism, potential links with interna-
tional terrorist networks, and separatist Uyghur organisations. (51) While the
NIA requests public funds in order to build places of worship, the RAB acts
as an intermediary between the NIA and Nanjing city council, which has
the last word. This mediatory position of the RAB underlines its close rela-
tionship with the NIA but also reveals its relative weakness, which some-
times forces the association to turn to other bodies that hold more sway
at the local level.
The United Front Department is another important body with which the
association collaborates. As an organ of the local committee of the CCP, it
carries considerable political weight, which means that its intervention can,
in specific cases, help resolve a situation that the RAB would be unable to
manage on its own. As outlined below, although the United Front Depart-
ment is very active in selecting the leaders of the association, it nevertheless
cannot be considered a body with which the NIA can liaise on a regular
basis in order to relay its requests. This distant position is reflected in the
internal structure of the United Front Department. Since its range of actions
extends far beyond religious questions, it does not have a department
specifically in charge of relations with Islam. Furthermore, although its of-
ficials are sometimes present at NIA meetings, none of them are Hui, which
appears to distance the administration further from the religious associa-
tions.
The municipal Political Consultative Conference appears to be another
possible body with which the NIA can liaise via the representatives it sends.
As a symbol of the United Front strategy, it is an assembly with a consul-
tative role whose purpose is to represent levels of society that are not con-
nected with the Communist Party. In theory, representatives of the
Communist Party cannot hold more than one third of the seats. The way in
which representatives are selected is ambiguous, but it appears that the
United Front Department at the provincial level has the last word, basing
its decision on ambiguous criteria such as the suitability of the person’s po-
litical behaviour or his influence in the community. Some members of the
NIA, mainly the ahong, are therefore present as representatives of the reli-
gious world, making this one of the few places where an important position
is given to the ahong. They are then able to make requests in their own way,
even though these will be decided upon within the NIA.
These seats in the Political Consultative Conferences at various levels offer
a means of conveying messages to the administration in a more organised
manner and sometimes carrying more weight than when they are addressed
to the RAB. Most of the problems facing Islam in Nanjing, such as the lack
of places of worship or the poor level of oversight over qingzhen prod-
ucts, (52) are presented at the municipal Political Consultative Conference. (53)
In exceptional cases, problems that remain unresolved can be taken up with
the provincial, or indeed national, Political Consultative Conference, in par-
ticular when the question concerns legislative changes. However, the use-
fulness of the Political Consultative Conference is often called into question.
First and foremost, it provides a platform for dialogue that, at best, makes
it possible to transfer requests with more weight to the relevant local gov-
ernment departments, but has no decision-making power of its own.
A dovetailing of staff and networks
The Party-state has a major influence on the selection of leaders of the
association. In this area, the United Front Department of the CCP has more
power than the RAB. It has to make sure of leaders’ allegiance to the Party,
their ability to represent the community, and their administrative abilities.
The Party-state seeks bodies to liaise with that are reliable and with which
it can build up a relationship of trust. They must also know how to refrain
from making requests that are non-negotiable or unacceptable.
Although belonging to the Hui community is one of the criteria used when
choosing leaders, as stated in the NIA’s statute, (54) candidates do not have
to be practicing Muslims. On the other hand, being a member of the CCP is
a major advantage when it comes to becoming a leader of a local Islamic
association. At the time of our research, the chairman of the NIA, as well as
his first vice-chairman, (55) were members of the Party. As we shall see, this
contributed to an atmosphere of non-belief. The apparent impossibility of
CCP members displaying religious affiliation should therefore be called into
serious question. This is a recurring debate in the CCP, as underlined by
MacInnis in 1989, when local administrations were already aware of this
situation, even though it was forbidden. For example, the United Front De-
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partment of Ningxia estimated that in the Hui villages of the province, 70%
to 80% of Party officials had participated in religious activities and that
10% were believers. (56) It appears that this phenomenon is tacitly accepted
by the authorities.
The fact that NIA leaders are selected by the local administrations rein-
forces its connection to the latter, rather than to higher-level Islamic asso-
ciations. Officials of the RAB and the United Front Department actively
prepare changes to the management team with the NIA. They meet each
candidate for the positions of chairman, general secretary, and vice-chair-
man for an assessment interview. Their first choices are always those ac-
cepted by the association committee.
This system leads to a certain consanguinity in the staff. When it was es-
tablished in 1959, the NIA’s chairman was Ma Zhuoran, who was also the
director of the municipal RAB and vice-director of the United Front Depart-
ment of Nanjing. This practice of placing an acting official at the head of
the NIA ended when the latter reopened following the Cultural Revolution.
In contrast to the Maoist period, the idea was to give the associations a
higher level of autonomy, while maintaining their close links with the state.
However, the RAB in Nanjing continued an old practice dating back to 1959
by sending some of its employees to work in the NIA. At the time of the
research, four of the eight permanent staff members of the NIA, including
the secretary of the association, were actually drawing a salary from the
RAB.
The fact that a position as important in the day-to-day operation of the
NIA as its secretary is filled by a member of the RAB ensured a certain level
of compliance on the part of the association and eliminated any potential
competition between the two organisations. Moreover, the practice of the
administration funding the secretary of an association appears to be com-
monplace at the local level in China. Kenneth Foster has written of similar
practices taking place in business associations in Yantai. (57) By means of a
subtle process of supporting the development of the association, the state
is thus able to shape it without exerting direct and repressive control.
By studying the professions of the leaders of the NIA, it becomes clear
that apart from the ahong, the organisation is dominated by academics
and, above all, retired Party-state officials. For example, at the time of the
research, the chairman of the NIA was Bai Meilin, former director of the
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform. The first vice-chairman,
meanwhile, was a former vice-director of the Nanjing Political Consultative
Conference. By giving these leadership positions in the NIA to former offi-
cials, combined with the presence of RAB employees among the permanent
staff members of the NIA, the state has a subtle means for spreading the
principles and administrative standards that it wishes to prevail within the
association.
Integration of the administrative principle
The important positions held by retired officials in the NIA create an at-
mosphere of non-belief. Like the permanent staff members of the RAB, these
leaders are generally not considered to be close followers of the religion by
members of the community, and especially by more religious migrants from
the northwest. We were told a number of times that “they do not pray or
observe Ramadan.” They are not demanding in terms of the religious apti-
tude of the ahong, instead placing more emphasis on protecting social order.
As far as the ahong are concerned, it is difficult for them to put pressure on
the association to focus on disseminating what they consider to be the
proper practice of Islam because, as employees of the NIA, they run the risk
of being excluded or dismissed.
This results in the formation of a group of association leaders that share
the same vision of their connection with the Party State and maintain a
good relationship with it. However, the duality of the phenomenon should
not be overlooked. Although the chairman of the NIA “sees religion from
an official’s perspective,” as we were told a number of times, his links with
members of the administration and his familiarity with it mean he is a par-
ticularly effective spokesperson for the association. As such, retired officials
appear to play the role of intermediaries between the associations and the
administration. They are “generalists” in the view of Olivier Nay and Andy
Smith, producing an “ideological patchwork” that facilitates the integration
of distinct institutional environments. They therefore play a role that ex-
tends beyond merely mediating between the two organisations; they also
influence their values. (58)
This “consanguine alliance” is appreciated by the community insofar as
its leaders can make use of their networks within the administration to help
the association and local Islam grow financially, which is a key issue owing
to the limited financial resources of this minority.
Involving the administration in the development of
local Islam
The network of Bai Meilin, chairman of the NIA, linked with the impor-
tance of his previous position in the municipal administration, played a fun-
damental role in the process of NIA taking back control of the land of the
old mosques in the city, which took place between 1980 and 2000. Some
situations were difficult to resolve, and Bai’s network of contacts made it
possible to put pressure on high-level organs of the municipality. For exam-
ple, certain buildings had been converted into subsidised housing for civil
servants when they were in the hands of the administration. Their function
had not been reviewed when the NIA took control of them in the 1980s,
and they continued to be rented to civil servants for nominal sums. When
this land was taken back, with the help of Bai Meilin’s network of contacts,
it led to a considerable increase in the NIA’s income, enabling it to increase
its activities, particularly regarding social welfare (59) This is the opposite sit-
uation to the one of Islamic associations in Xinjiang, where lack of funding
is depriving them of the ability to influence local Islam. (60)
The networks of the leaders of the NIA have made it possible to obtain
high sums of money from the local authorities in order to rebuild the city’s
mosques. In his finest hour, Bai Meilin collected more than 6 million yuan
in 2007 from various departments of the municipal and provincial govern-
ment in order to reconstruct Jingjue Mosque, the biggest establishment of
its kind in the city. The most recent project put forward by Bai Meilin in-
volves creating a “Muslim Centre” several storeys high at the site of the old
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mosque on Taiping Street. It will be home to various businesses that will be
run either by the NIA or by third parties that will pay rent, thus increasing
the NIA’s income. The mosque will be on the top floor. When the project
was set up, a Saudi bank proposed to finance the centre, raising the question
of foreign funding in Chinese places of worship. Although some members
were in favour of this Saudi contribution, the proposal was turned down by
the NIA. Chinese policy is very strict with regards to the use of foreign funds
to finance Islam, and the association would have needed to conduct difficult
negotiations with the administration, both locally and at a national level. (61)
The NIA therefore avoided a possible confrontation with the state by fil-
tering out a “sensitive” request that it did not deem essential, and main-
tained its role as a reliable point of contact.
The strong links between the NIA and the local administration also enable
it to negotiate with the authorities on the issue of tolerance with regard to
the “grey market of religion,” an expression coined by Yang Fenggang in ref-
erence to practices having uncertain legal status. (62) The “Regulation on Re-
ligious Affairs” stipulates that in the case of Islam, the mosque is the only
place where public religious activities can take place legally, and must be
registered with the local RAB. However, there is a shortage of mosques in
Nanjing, a problem made more acute by the high number of Muslim mi-
grants from the northwestern parts of the country. The custom being to
pray as a group on Fridays, some people invite their loved ones to pray at
their homes or businesses. The authorities turn a blind eye to these “domes-
tic prayers” provided they involve a private circle of relations. However, such
groups can grow rapidly, which the administration views as a factor for in-
stability. The possibility of legalising some of these gathering places in order
to recognise them as places of worship indicated by a notice is being dis-
cussed with the municipal RAB. If this should come to pass, the NIA would
designate the premises in question with the approval of the RAB, and would
ensure they complied with religious regulations.
The NIA and RAB therefore have a very strong cooperative relationship
that provides them with a certain degree of flexibility in their shared work.
In Nanjing, this cooperation appears moreover to be facilitated by the low
level of financial competition between the RAB and the NIA. The latter is
guaranteed income from rent paid on the land over which it has gradually
retaken control, and over which the RAB has no claim. Furthermore, contrary
to the situation reported in the case of Buddhism, the city’s mosques do
not represent an issue in terms of tourism. (63) Furthermore, cooperating with
the AIN appears to be positive for the local RAB, because it is promoted by
the central state. The city of Nanjing was thus named “Model city for the
progress of unity between national minorities” (quanguo minzu tuanjie jinbu
mofan chengshi) in 2009 by the State Affairs Council.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the NIA is an agency that defends the vision of local Islam
that its leaders share with a part of the administration. It therefore guaran-
tees its status as a privileged intermediary between the Party-State and
Muslims by helping the material development of a depoliticised local Islam.
It provides the community with a platform for discussion with the author-
ities, albeit one to which access is restricted, while also ensuring a certain
level of social stability from the State’s point of view. Finally, the link be-
tween the RAB and the NIA echoes the work carried out by David Wank on
the relationship between the administration and business at a local level in
China. This uncovered not an increasing degree of independence from the
State of associations that form a “civil society,” but rather the development
of “local coalitions” between state and civil agents. (64) Our study is in line
with the idea that shedding light on these networks helps to build an un-
derstanding of the continuous adaptation of the institutions of the Party-
state and the diversity of local arrangements.
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